Abstract-Computers face an ever increasing number of threats from hackers, viruses and other malware; effective Network Intrusion Detection (NID) before a threat affects enduser machines is critical for both financial and national security. As the number of threats and network speeds increase (over 1 gigabit/sec), users of conventional software based NID methods must choose between protection or higher data rates.
I. INTRODUCTION
Viruses, worms, and hacker attacks on networks cost billions of dollars (Klez virus: $9 billion [1] ) and affect hundreds of thousands of users (MSBlast worm: over 350,000 hosts) [2] . Additionally, recent high profile attacks on our national security infrastructure-such as the infiltration of DoD networks by Chinese hackers [3] -reveal that defense against network intrusion is now a matter of not just financial, but also national security.
It is incorrect to assume that each user or individual machine on a network is secure [4] . This is due to the large number of machines that need to be secured; each of which requires time, technical expertise and constant vigilance to ensure protection against the latest threats. To address these short comings organizations are moving toward Network Intrusion Detection (NID): preemptive detection of hacking attacks, worms, and other threats present in data when it enters the network, i.e. before it can reach the user's machine.
Network Intrusion Detection involves looking at patterns in network data that match known signatures stored in an existing threat-database. Currently, NID is performed using
The design and results presented here were part of an undergraduate project, advised by I. Dalal, at the Cooper Union dedicated devices from manufacturers such as Cisco. These devices are essentially full-blown computers using software solutions such as pattern matching with hash tables to perform NID [5] . However, as both network data rates and the number of potential threats increase, the ability to effectively scan network data in real time using such devices becomes impractical. For example, while Gigabit (1000 megabits/sec) networks are increasing in popularity, a typical Cisco NID device [5] has a maximum throughput of only 150 megabits/sec.
As a result, there has been a move toward custom hardware implementations of network intrusion detection which can have significantly higher throughput [2] , [6] . Rather than fabricate custom ICs, Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are used for this purpose. FPGAs are reconfigurable chips that contain programmable logic and can perform multiple, complex operations in parallel, and have become the dominant platform for hardware-based NID. Such NID devices can offer real-time protection against a wide array of threats while achieving throughputs of over 1 gigabit/sec [7] . To ensure the highest possible throughput we used Bloom filters an efficient data structure for hardware-based pattern matching. Bloom Filters store a compact randomized representation of the threat-database, allowing for a number of advantages over traditional hash tables which have a large amount of overhead and require enough memory to store the full threat-database. The basic Bloom Filter can be improved into a Counting Bloom Filter which allows for even more flexibility.
In this project, we present the first optimized, countingbloom-filter-based Network Intrusion Detection "system-onchip" (i.e., on a single FPGA chip) implemented on a Virtex 4 FPGA: our design is scalable through further parallelization and, to our knowledge, is one of the highest throughput NID systems in existence.
We first present the probabilistic mathematics that are the basis of Bloom Filters, and the evolution of Bloom Filters into Counting Bloom Filters. We then discuss the design process and computer architectural challenges in hardware implementations of Bloom Filters. Finally, we use hardware Counting Bloom Filters to set up a Network Intrusion Detection system, test it with real-world threats and present performance benchmarks.
Outline
The outline of our paper is as follows:
• Overview of Bloom Filters and Hash Functions:
The structure and mathematical background of Bloom Filters, followed by performance analysis. 
II. OVERVIEW OF BLOOM FILTERS AND HASH FUNCTIONS
A Bloom Filter is a data structure used to determine if a given piece of data belongs to a set [8] , [9] . To perform this "pattern-matching", Bloom Filters do not store the full set, but only a much smaller randomized representation; this makes them much more efficient than conventional hash tables [10] .
A. Definition
The goal of the Bloom Filter is to determine if a given piece of data (e.g., network packet) belongs to a predefined set (e.g., threat-database). Bloom Filters consist of two key parts: an array of bits (known as the Bloom array and initialized to ZEROs) and one or more hash functions. The Bloom array has a length of m-bits and a total of k hash functions. First, the Bloom Filter must be programmed with a predefined set which consists of n elements. This is accomplished by hashing each element of the set through the k hash functions; the output of the hash functions are used as indices (addresses) for the m-bit array and the bits at the corresponding addresses are 'set' (i.e. changed to ONE).
After programming, to check if a piece of data is a member of the set (known as querying), that data is hashed. If all the corresponding bits of the Bloom array are set (ONE), then that piece of data is almost certainly part of the predefined set; if any of the corresponding bits are not set (ZERO), the data is definitely not a part of the set (i.e., for NID, there is no threat). The check thus consists of performing an AND logical operation on the corresponding bits and checking if the output is ZERO or ONE.
Thus, a Bloom Filter can definitely tell if a piece of data does not belong to the set (i.e., is not a threat), but there is a very small chance of a false positive: data is identified as belonging to the set (a threat) when it actually is not. This false positive probability can be controlled and made arbitrarily small, so is not usually an issue.
B. Choosing Hash Functions for Hardware Bloom Filters
The Bloom Filter's accuracy depends critically on the choice of hash function [9] . A hash function is essentially a oneway mapping between two sets. For two sets U and V , an ideal (or perfectly random) hash function uniformly maps each element in U to a unique element in V (Fig. 1a) . Real-world hash functions are rarely ideal and can have collisions, i.e. the mapping is no longer unique and more than one element in U may map to the same element in V (Fig. 1b) . Expressed mathematically, for elements x, y ∈ U, x = y, an ideal hash function H(·) will have no collisions, i.
e. H(x) = H(y); on the other hand, for a non-ideal hash function G(·) collisions can occur (i.e., G(x) = G(y)).
Collisions in a Bloom Filter lead to false positives and decrease its effectiveness. Hence, hash functions for Bloom Filters in hardware must not only be as close to ideal as possible (i.e., have a low collision rate), but also have low hardware complexity (which allows for high throughput). Additionally, since the length of the Bloom array varies depending on the application, the hash function should have variable-length outputs. Given these requirements we used the H 3 hash functions, a member of the Universal Class of hash functions. These hash functions are low-complexity randomized algorithms that attempt to distribute the data inputs along the set of hash outputs as evenly as possible; with the appropriate choice of random numbers they have low collision rates and can be configured for arbitrary length outputs [11] . H 3 hash functions are an excellent choice for Bloom Filters, and have recently been successfully used for this purpose [7] , [8] . 
C. H 3 Hash Functions
where · (AND) and ⊕ (XOR) are logical operations. The result h(x) is used to address the bit array of the Bloom Filter; this is demonstrated in Fig. 2 . By using different random matrices, as many different hash functions as necessary can be generated. It is important to note that H 3 hash functions behave like an ideal hash function when used with real-world data. This is because real-world data can be treated as random for the purposes of determining hash function performance [12] .
D. Formal definition of Bloom Filters
Mathematically, a Bloom Filter is defined as a compact representation of a set S = {x 1 , x 2 ,...,x n } of n elements stored in an array of m bits (all of which are initially ZERO); the k hash functions {h 1 ,...,h k } are independent and have a range of {1,...,m} (i.e. each hash function maps uniformly to a random number from 1 to m).
1) Programming the Bloom Filter (Fig. 2a):
The set S must first be programmed in the Bloom Filter (e.g., S can be a certain set of known threats). For all x ∈ S, each x is hashed by the k hash functions h i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) and the bits in the Bloom array corresponding to the outputs h i (x) are set to ONE as shown in Fig. 2a .
2) Querying the Bloom Filter (Fig. 2b) : After the Bloom Filter is programmed, it is put into operation. To check if an item y is a member of S (e.g., for intrusion detection, does a packet contain a virus signature y?), you must hash it with all k hashes and then check to see if all the bits in the Bloom array corresponding to h i (y) are set to ONE (Fig. 2b) . If they are not ONE, then y is definitely not a member of S; but, if they are all ONEs, then we assume y is a member of S, although it may not be with a very small finite probability (i.e. a false positive) [9] . 
E. False Positive Probability
A false positive occurs when an element that is not in the set is hashed and all the corresponding k bits in the Bloom array turn out to be ONE; the probability of this occurring is
where k is the optimal number of hash functions for a given m-bit Bloom array that will hold n entries.
A derivation of this can be found in the appendix.
III. COUNTING BLOOM FILTERS AND FPGA OVERVIEW
A major limitation of Bloom Filters is that once an element has been programmed into the array, it cannot be deleted without erasing and reprogramming the filter from scratch. This is because there is no way to reset the bits corresponding to one element to ZERO and ensure that none of those bits were needed by another element still in the Bloom Filter. To address this deficiency, Bloom Filters have been adapted into Counting Bloom Filters (CBFs).
A CBF is identical to a standard Bloom Filter in concept, but differs in implementation: the Bloom array for a CBF consists of counters and not individual bits (Fig. 3) . By using counters for a CBF, you can add and remove items from the CBF. Instead of setting a bit when programming it, you increment (+1) the corresponding counters; when deleting an item you decrement (−1) the corresponding counters. To query the CBF for the existence of some piece of data, you check if all the corresponding counters in the Bloom array are non-zero (like checking if all corresponding bits are set to ONEs in a standard Bloom Filter).
A. Designing Counting Bloom Filters
Since each counter in the CBF array has a limited size, some new challenges are introduced, such as what to do if a counter overflows because too many elements are added. Empirically, a reasonable counter size that minimizes overflows for most applications is four bits [9] .
Regardless of the counter size, there is always the possibility that you reach the maximum value of a counter and an overflow occurs: in this situation it is best to leave the counter at its maximum value [9] . While this could potentially cause a false negative (which is impossible with standard Bloom Filters), if the deletions from the CBF are more-or-less random (as is the case with real-world data), and the counter is of a reasonable size (i.e. 4 bits), the average time until a false negative occurs is extremely large [9] . We used CBFs for our network intrusion detection as they allow for dynamic re-programming (add/delete) of the filter. This flexibility is highly desirable to ensure that the filter is up to date, e.g. if a new worm outbreak occurs (add), or if an attack is no longer a threat because the affected software was patched (delete), etc. The CBFs drawbacks are outweighed by their advantages, the abundant resources on the FPGA (mitigating the memory requirement), and the very low probability of a false negative.
B. Overview of FPGA Architecture
The Field Programmable Gate Array is made up of 4-bit or 6-bit Look-Up Tables (LUTs) which can be programmed to compute any Boolean function of 4 or 6 inputs, respectively. Thousands of these LUTs make up an FPGA and are connected by reprogrammable interconnects, allowing for immense flexibility in implementing any digital function which can be optimized by performing many operations in parallel. Fig. 4a shows the basic structure of a contemporary FPGA; apart from LUTs, the FPGA also contains blocks of fast static random-access memories (block RAMs) and (optionally) an embedded microprocessor, such as the PowerPC, to perform control and data transfer functions. The FPGA chip itself is usually integrated on a board that contains additional I/O and storage peripherals such as Ethernet controllers, DDR RAM modules, and serial ports.
The FPGA is an excellent platform for hosting a Bloom Filter as it contains the fast RAM (i.e. Block RAMs) needed to minimize the time it takes access the bit array, and its LUTs are ideal for performing multiple H 3 hashes (XOR operations) in parallel. It is due to this fact that a number of Bloom Filter implementations on FPGAs exist for applications such as spell checking, medical imaging and network intrusion detection [7] , [8] , [10] , [13] .
IV. HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATIONS AND ANALYSIS
Before moving on to Network Intrusion Detection, we first designed, optimized and implemented the necessary Bloom Filters on the FPGA. We have implemented three Bloom Filters in both standard and Counting variants on the Xilinx Virtex-4 FX12 FPGA hosted on the ML403 development board (Fig 4b) . The FPGA consists of 5,472 slices (a slice contains two LUTs), 36 block RAMs (of 18-kbits each), and an embedded PowerPC 405 processor. The embedded processor eliminates the need for a separate computer to perform control functions such as TCP/IP network communication, making intelligent decisions in the NID threat detection process, etc; this enabled us to make this a "system-on-a-chip."
A. Standard Bloom Filter Implementation
The Bloom array (m = 16384-bits) is stored in Block RAM on the FPGA. To maximize throughput and minimize the control and routing logic, we give each hash function exclusive access to the block RAM via a dedicated I/O port. We achieve this as follows: since each block RAM has two I/O ports (i.e., you can perform two independent reads/writes to different addresses per clock cycle), and we have k = 8 hashes, we split the bit array across While each hash function has to be modified so its output falls within the range of its "exclusive" block RAM, this does not effect the false positive rate or the effectiveness of the Bloom Filter [7] . An AND gate is used to perform the final membership check.
B. Counting Bloom Filter Implementation
As described in section III, going from a standard Bloom Filter to a counting Bloom Filter design simply involves modifying the Bloom array so that each "bit" is a 4-bit counter instead. We implemented our CBF by storing the counter values in block RAM; each block RAM (there are 36 on the FPGA) has a capacity of 18-kbits. The RAM was used at a 4-bit depth, and 4-bit adders were included to increment/decrement the RAM counters while comparators were used to check if the counters were 'set' (i.e., its value was greater than zero). Using the LUTs as the "counters" was considered (as a counter is a 4-bit Boolean function) but rejected due to an insufficient number of LUTs on the FPGA and the large routing overhead which would have substantially decreased performance.
CBFs are somewhat slower at programming than a standard Bloom Filter: while the standard Bloom Filter takes one clock cycle to change a bit, the CBF takes two clock cycles to modify a counter; the original value must be read, incremented (for an add) or decremented (for a delete), and then written Table  (RAM) H1 H8
2-byte CBF
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NID System on a Chip back to update the counter. The extra programming time is immaterial since after the initial programming, the CBF array only needs occasional reprogramming (for updates). We note that checking (reading) the CBF array, which is by far the major operation in an NID device, only requires a single clock cycle; thus, using CBFs has negligible effect on throughput compared to standard Bloom Filters.
Our maximum throughput was approximately 3.3 Gbps; a complete summary of our results for the CBF prototype can be found in Table I. V. APPLICATION: NETWORK INTRUSION DETECTION As mentioned earlier, networks face a large variety of threats from hackers and malware that can cause damage in the billions of dollars and breach national security. Assuming that end-users can protect their systems is both inaccurate and ineffective. Detecting malicious data or events at the network boundaries (Network Intrusion Detection) allows for preemptive and broader protection from threats and creates a single point to maintain network security (as opposed to at every machine in the network). The NID device is installed at the gateway to the network it is protecting.
We have designed and implemented a Network Intrusion Detection (NID) device using Counting Bloom Filters to detect and mitigate threats before they enter a network. Fig. 5 shows the structure of our NID device. The input data-Ethernet packets (frames)-is fed to the preprocessor which extracts the IP packet, stripping the headers and forwarding the host information to the PowerPC and the TCP/UDP payload to the Counting Bloom Filters. The filters take 2-, 4-and 8-byte data inputs respectively; this is because the threat patterns (such as ILOVEYOU for the Love Bug worm) can be of variable size; the preprocessor must be used to keep track of patterns longer than 8-bytes-we have not implemented this capability yet.
A flow chart showing how our NID device operates is shown in Fig. 7 . After the CBFs, an intelligent processor is needed to analyze the output of the CBFs and decide if a threat is detected. Instead of offloading this to a separate computer or microprocessor (e.g., as is done in some commercial NID systems [5] ) we decided to design the NID device as a complete system-on-chip by using the embedded PowerPC processor. Once the PowerPC detects a threat from the CBF outputs, it eliminates the possibility of a false positive by verifying if that piece of data in question is present in the secondary hash table (stored in DDR RAM on the FPGA board). Note that this hybrid "bloom filter + small secondary hash table" approach is much faster and uses less memory than a full hash-table approach.
If the threat is confirmed, the NID device drops the data packet and sends an Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) datagram of type DESTINATION UNREACHABLE with explanation code "Host administratively prohibited" to the source of the malicious packet. Furthermore, a UDP packet is sent to a logging facility where the system administrator can further analyze the alerts. The NID device can also take more drastic steps such as IP blocking of known/persistent hosts to avoid denial of service attacks on the NID device. Additionally, since we use CBFs-as opposed to standard Bloom Filters-an administrator is able to modify the database (add or remove signatures) in real-time using the serial port on the ML403 development board to rapidly respond to emerging threats.
NID System-on-a-Chip: Testing and Performance
For our proof-of-concept NID implementation, we chose a realistically-sized n = 2048 element data set containing signatures for a variety of intrusions: viruses, trojans, worms, denial of service attacks, brute-force unauthorized access attempts and spam. The signatures are based on a subset of the malicious payloads included in the industry-standard Snort (ver. 2.4) rule-set [14] .
Given n = 2048, with the additional constraint of a small false positive probability (< 2.5%), to arrive at an optimal Bloom array length of m = 16384 bits and k = 8 hash functions (this was done using eqns. (5) and (6) found in the Appendix). Since the signatures vary in length, each Bloom Filter accepts a different-sized input: 2-, 4-, or 8-bytes respectively.
In evaluating the performance of the Bloom Filters we programmed each of the filters with an increasing number of elements, from n = 128 to 2048, based on the Snort rule-set and custom-crafted signatures, testing the false positive rate on simulated traffic. It is important to note that the customcrafted signatures were used in cases where the number of Snort payload signatures was not sufficient (i.e. < n).
Based on real world data [15] and the testing methodologies presented in [16] , we simulated random traffic on the order of ≈ 70,000 connections of which 2.58% were attacks (i.e., connections whose payloads contained signatures which were used to program the filters). The number of normal and attack connections in a time interval were distributed according to a Poisson process resulting in normal and "attack" intervals; in an attack interval the majority of the connections had payloads with malicious signatures [16] . 
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented a single-chip, FPGA-based hardware Network Intrusion Detection (NID) system using Counting Bloom Filters. Our design identifies and can neutralize threats such as hackers and viruses at the network boundary before they can attack end-user computers. As network data rates increase, such real-time preemptive action may prove impractical for software NID solutions.
Counting Bloom Filters are efficient, randomized data structures that are much faster and use less memory than the hash tables usually used in software applications. Consequently, our NID device has a throughput of ∼3.3 Gbps-over an order of magnitude higher than commercial software-based NID systems.
Future work includes increasing the number and variety of threat-signatures that the system can detect as well as full scale testing on a live network. We hope that by increasing the flexibility and speed of effective Network Intrusion Detection we can help secure computers against malicious attacks, reduce associated financial losses and prevent the compromise of national security.
APPENDIX FALSE POSITIVE PROBABILITY DERIVATION
Here we derive the probability of getting a false positive when querying a Bloom Filter.
Consider an m-bit array; since the output of each hash function is uniformly and independently distributed over the range {1,...,m}, the probability that a bit is set (i.e., ONE) after a single hash of one element is 1 m . The probability that a bit is not set (i.e., ZERO) is, therefore, (1 − 1 m ). To program a Bloom Filter using k hash functions on a set with n entries, a total of n · k hashing operations are
